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I. Introduction
The institution of the Single European Market (SEM) in the end of 1992 and the achievement 
of monetary union by the end of the century will together create a powerful new entity within the word 
economy The European Community (EC) will become an integrated economy of just under 350 
million people producing approximately one third of all output by members of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and today accounting for over 26 per cent of world 
exports. This extraordinary economic transformation will inevitably have a considerable impact on the 
performance of both the EC economy and the world economy more generally.
To the extent that macroeconomic effects may be meaningfully separated from microeconomic 
effects, the macroeconomic impact on non-member States will be shaped by a combination of two sets 
influences. First, the macroeconomic performance of an area representing one third of the OECD 
economy will necessarily be a significant determinant of the performance of the other two thirds. So 
the rate of growth, the rate of price inflation, and the conduct of monetary policy within the EC will all 
be important components of the macroeconomic environment in which the rest of the world operates. 
Second, the creation of a single currency in Europe w ill necessarily mean changes in the organization of 
international trade and finance and in the operation of the international monetary system.
The scale and content of these effects are not. of course, independent of one another. The 
impact and the role of the ecu within the international monetary system is dependent on the 
macroeconomic performance of the EC. and vise versa. However, at the current stage of the European 
monetary evolution, in which the institutional relationships of economic and monetary union (EMU) 
have already been designed (even though occasionally revised), it is useful to consider them separately, 
as will be done in the sections following the discussion on the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) and on 
European introversion. In both cases it will be argued that there are important design flaws in the 
current proposals that are likely to result in macroeconomic inefficiency1 both within the EC and in the 
international economy as a whole Then, a provisional assessment is sketched of Greece s overall 
comparative performance and of the prospects for the country's overall successful participation
II. The ERM as the Precursor of Monetary Union
Since 1987 there have been no realignments of panties w ithin the ERM." and members States 
clearly intend to avoid realignments if possible. The absence of realignments, together with the closer
By «macroeconomic inefficiencv» is meant the persistence of a trend rate of grow th below that w hich, 
with current resources and technological expertise, is potentially sustainable.
Other than the Italian quasi-realignment in January 1990. The lira had fluctuated w ithin the bands of 
6 per cent around the central parity. In reducing fluctuations to the more typical bands of 2.25 per cent
9
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monetary cooperation established in the Basle-Nyborg Agreements of 1987 and the removal of controls 
on capital movements, have led to the characterization of the post-1987 ERM as a «new» European 
Monetary System (EMS) This new EMS comprises a system of fixed exchange rates and integrated 
financial markets, in contrast to the «old», pre-1987 EMS. which has essentially a crawling peg 
buttressed by banners to the movement of capital* 3
In an era of free capital movements, the disruptive potential of speculative capital flows 
induced by even the possibility of exchange rate changes has greatly increased the importance of 
maintaining currency credibility. A credible commitment to a given parity will, it is hoped, discourage 
speculation. Lack of credibility must be paid for in interest rate premia. In increasingly integrated 
capital markets, such penalties may be imposed not only on currencies that are perceived as weak, but 
on the system as a whole. The creation of a single currency will remove this upward bias in interest 
rates by removing the need for these credibility premia.
The new EMS has arisen from attempts by members of the ERM to emulate a single currency 
by convincing the markets of their commitment to maintaining parity, most notably with the deutsche 
mark whatever might be the implications of the commitment for the conduct of domestic policy. This 
has produced some paradoxical results. Since credibility plays a vital part in the determination of 
capital flows, the attainment of a credible commitment to the new EMS has resulted in the overfunding 
of current account deficits in high-inflation, high-interest rate members such as Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece, pushing their exchange rates to the top of the permitted trading band The credibility of the 
fixed rate means that the high normal rate of interest in Greece translates into a very high real rate when 
compared to, say, the German rate of inflation. However, some lack of credibility over Greece's ability 
to commit to its entry parity, notably in light of the co-existence of large and persistent current account 
deficits with domestic recession, will most likely result in its future entry 's being accompanied by a 
persistent weak drachma.
In some ways, therefore, the new EMS imitates the operation of a monetary union in which 
States surrender control of their monetary policy to a central body. Although today monetary policy is, 
of course, still the responsibility of the authorities of the member States, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that not all member States have actual control over this policy. Indeed, fixed exchange rates, free 
capital movement and autonomous monetary policies are incompatible. Under the new EMS the role of 
setting monetary policy has been devolved to the Deutsche Bundesbank But in these circumstances the
the Bank of Italy took the opportunity to retain the lower limit of fluctuation and move its central 
reference parity down to 3.7 per cent.
3 In this. Giavazzi and Spaventa (1990. p 74) write that financial liberalization has been 
accompanied bv a 'regime change . It is as if the authorities had realized that once the exchange 
controls are gone, realignments become virtually impossible, since the mere possibility of a realignment
3
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conduct of monetary policy is quite different from that which would prevail in a proper monetary- union. 
In current circumstances, monetary policy is essentially asymmetric. German monetary- policy is 
determined primarily (though, perhaps not absolutely) by German domestic concerns. The monetary- 
policy of other ERM members are determined by the need to maintain the parities of their currencies 
with the deutsche mark. The factors that establish the position and role of Germany yvithin the EMS 
are the former's industrial dominance within the EC, which translates into persistent German current 
account surpluses, and the loyv inflation rate anchor of the deutsche mark (Portes, 1989). Of course, 
the pressures on the German economy arising from unification may alter this pattern of monetary- 
relationships. Whether this does happen and yvhat the consequences will be. depend on the medium- to 
long-term impact of reunification on the competitive strength of the German economy.
The degree to yvhich the conduct of European monetary policy will be changed yvith the 
establishment of EMU. and the transfer of monetary policy from the Deutsche Bundesbank to the 
Eurofed (the European central bank yvhich yvill manage the single currency) can only, at present, be a 
matter of speculation. The draft constitution for Eurofed is virtually identical to the Bundesbank’s, 
requiring the European bank as its primary responsibility to pursue monetary policies that strengthen 
price stability.4 None the less, the current asymmetry in monetary policy will formally disappear yvith 
EMU. as monetary policy will be determined on a European scale.
III. The Introversion of the EC
A further aspect of the EC's performance over the past decade that bears on the likely effects 
of EMU is the groyving introversion of Community trade. The balance betyvcen intra- and extra-EC 
trade has syvung steadily in favor of the former since the foundation of the EC (see table 1). This 
groyving introversion has also resulted in national trade balances being determined predominantly by 
intra-EC trade.
would stir up an unsustainable speculative attack. The committment to fixed exchange rates then 
becomes the only alternative to abandoning the EMS and letting exchange rates float freely
The Communication of the EC Commission of 21 August 1990, declares the first fundamental 
principle of Eurofed to be the "objective: price stability. Subject to this objective. Eurofed should 
support the general economic policy set at the Community level by the competent authorities (p. 37). 
It is not at all clear over a yvidc range of economic policy yvho the commission believes are the 
competent authorities".
4
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Table 1. SHARES OF rNTRA-EC TRADE IN EC TOTAL TRADE, 1958-1992 
(Percentage)
1958 1992
Greece Exports 50.9 64.2
Imports 53.7 62.7
France Exports 30.9 63.0
Imports 28.3 65.6
Germany Exports 37.9 54.1
Imports 36.3 54.7
United Kingdom Exports 21.7 55.5
Imports 21.8 50.7
All members Exports 37.2 61.3
Imports 35.2 59.3
Source: European Economy. No. 58. 1994. p. 155.
Whereas in the 1960s, 37.9 per cent of exports and 36.3 per cent of imports of the then Federal 
Republic of Germany were absorbed by intra-EC trade in 1992, the numbers increased to 54 .1 per cent 
and 54.7 per cent respectively, showing an almost 50 per cent increase in Germany's trade surplus. 
Similarly, whereas in the 1950s, 50.9 per cent of exports and 53.7 per cent of imports of Greece were 
absorbed by intra-EC trade, in 1992 the numbers increased to 64.2 per cent and 62.7 per cent 
respectively, without however indicating a significant change in the share of intra-EC trade deficit. The 
introversion of EC trade seems to have been brought about (at least outside agriculture) by trade 
creation rather than trade diversion (see table 2 )
Table 2 INTRA-EC TRADE AND EXTRA-EC TRADE OF GOODS 
(percentage of EC GDP at current prices)
Extra-EC exports Intra-EC exports and imports Extra-EC imports
1960 8.7 6.4 9.9
1965 7.1 7.6 8.8
1970 7.8 9.2 8.9
1975 9.4 10.5 10.3
1980 9.7 12.2 12.4
1985 11.4 14.0 12.2
1990 8.7 14.4 9.7
1994 9.1 14.4 8.9
Source. European Economy, No. 58. 1994, pp. 148-53.
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Table 3. EC BALANCE ON CURRENT TRANSACTIONS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD.
1961-1994. (Percentage of GDP at market prices.)
EC United States Japan
1961-1973 0.4 0.5 0.6
1974-1985 -0.2 -0.4 0.9
1986-1990 0.3 -2.5 2.8
1991 -0.6 0.2 2.5
1992 -0.3 -0.9 3.3
1993 0.9 -1.7 3.1
1994 1.3 -1.7 2.9
Source: European Economy. No. 58. 1994. p. 25.
In addition EC trade has tended to show its overall balance of payments to be near equilibrium. 
That this was so in the 1960s. and even the 1970s, when national current account balances were seldom 
very large as a proportion of national product, is unsurprising. But it is more notable as a characteristic 
of the 1980s and the 1990s, when very large national imbalances appeared and, indeed, persisted (see 
table 3). Thus even though individual countries have non-zero balances in their extra-EC trade, the EC 
as a whole does not. The counterpart to the German surplus has been a deficit in the rest of the EC, 
which must have been financed ultimately by capital flows from Germany. Net capital flows into the 
Community have been correspondingly small.
IV. Macroeconomic Performance of the EC
Monetary Union, defined as the establishment of a single currency,' will mean the 
establishment throughout the EC of a single monetary policy. There will be EC-wide rates of 
expansion of money and credit, a single structure of interest rates and a single external exchange rate. 
Each of the member states, including Germany,6 will have lost control over all tools of monetary
There has been some debate as to whether monetary union is achieved once exchange rates are 
irrevocably fixed or once a single unit of account is established throughout the participating States. 
The key issue is the degree of market expectation that the fixed rate of exchange might change or. 
equivalently, the monetary union be broken up. The debate is rather academic, since either could, in 
certain circumstances, be the more probable. Compare, for example, the break-up of the single 
currency union between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, and the longevity of the de facto dual 
currency union betw een the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands.
The former president of the Bundesbank has commented that "Monetary policy decisions can only be 
taken by a single entity. Even under a federative system, monetary policy must remain indivisible... In 
the [ECBS], therefore, it will not be possible for the national central banks to have autonomous
6
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policy These will now be the responsibility of an independent Eurofed.7 Evaluation of the likely 
effects of EMU amounts to assessment of the scale and implications of this national loss.
With monetary police determined by the Eurofed, the weight of national economic management 
will fall on fiscal police European monetary union will not be accompanied by fiscal union. On the 
contrary, fiscal police will remain the predominant responsibility of the member states, with the central 
budget of the EC remaining comparatively small (at present equal to 1 per cent of the GDP of the 
Community).
Of course the fiscal stance taken by one member State is not independent of those taken by 
others An expansionary policy pursued in one country will spill over into others, raising savings and 
tax revenues. The interdependence of fiscal policy is recognized by the Commission in its call for 
greater fiscal coordination through the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers. Still, this 
amounts only to coordination, not the formulation of a common fiscal policy.
The achievement of EMU within the EC will, therefore, create an economic environment that is 
historically unique. The EC will become an economic zone with a single currency and open markets, 
including open capital markets, linking increasing interdependent economies, yet it will remain divided 
into nation States that are virtually autonomous in fiscal terms. Despite the inclusion of the tenn 
"economic" in the title of EMU, very little overall fiscal management and virtually no fiscal integration 
is planned.
Compare this with the Bretton Woods system, which established a fixed exchange rate system 
between autonomous sovereign units, punctuated only rarely by parity realignments. Indeed, Bretton 
Woods was so stable that those currencies that are long-term members of the narrow-band ERM8 had 
experienced even less variation in their relative panties from 1961 to 1969 than has typically been the 
case since within the ERM (see Table 4) However, under the Bretton Woods system, unlike the ERM. 
national monetary and fiscal policies were shielded behind an elaborate structure of capital controls and 
a variety of trade restrictions and subsidies. The open markets condition did not apply.
monetary powers of their own: they will only be the operational arm of the European Central Bank" 
(Pohl. 1990. p. 9).
"Independent" in the sense that, w ithin the terms of its statutes, Eurofed will determine EC monetary 
policy. The board of Eurofed will be appointed for fixed terms and will not be subject to political 
recall Its formal position will, therefore, be similar to that of the Deutsche Bundesbank in Germany.
' Belgium. Denmark. France. Germany. Ireland. Luxemburg and the Netherlands.
7
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Table 4. INSTABILITY OF THE EXCHANGE RATES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
NARROW-BAND ERM
Nominal effective exchange 
rate relative to member 
countries'1
Percentage change in 
Nominal effective exchange 
rate relative to 19 industrial 
countries'3
1961-1969 0.9 -0.3
1970-1971 2.5 1.1
1972 1.6 2.0
1973 4.9 2.7
1974 4.0 -1.8
1975 4.0 1.4
1976-1978 4.4 -3.3
1979-1980 1.8 4.1
1981 2.0 -16.1
1982-1985 2.9 -6.7
1986 3.2 9.8
1987 2.9 6.9
1988 1.0 -1.6
1989 0.3 -3.0
1990 2.0 11.5
1991 2.1 -3.3
1992 2.9 2.3
1993 2.4 -9.0
1994 1.9 -3.4
Source: European Economy, No. 46, 1990. p. 144; No 58, 1994, p. 166.
a Unweighted average of the absolute annual percentage change of the currencies originally 
participating in the narrow -band of the ERM
b Average of the absolute annual percentage change of the twelve EC member currencies.
Or compare the ERM with mature monetary unions, such as Canada, the Federal Republic of 
Germany or the United States, within which there is a single currency and free capital movements. All 
these monetary unions deploy relatively large central budgets, which are a means of maintaining the 
economy's overall fiscal balance and of integrating fiscal policy within the union. Consequently, these 
monetary unions have the means of mitigating differences in incomes and productive potential existing 
in different parts of the union, as well as the means of offsetting regional socks. No such integrated 
fiscal system is planned for the EC.
Whether the novel structure planned for EMU will prove to be macroeconomically efficient 
depends on two features. First, it is a function of whether the mixture of policy instruments allows 
member States to sustain satisfactory rates of growth (that is, to maintain levels of emplo\ment) 
without suffering growing international indebtedness, including indebtedness within the EC Second, it 
depends on whether the fiscal policy instruments of the member States are sufficient to deal with their 
differing policy needs within the monetary union Would, for example. Greek fiscal policy be sufficient
8
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to deal with the differential impact on German industry of a change in the common external exchange 
rate of the ecu against the dollar?
Recognition of the potential inefficiencies that could arise from differences in policy stances 
among the economies of member States has led to an emphasis being placed on the need for 
convergence of national economies in their movements towards monetary union. However, these 
discussions show little clarity about the exact meaning of convergence and about the relationship 
between particular indicators of convergence and the attainment of common responses to policy 
measures. For example, monetary stability would require only convergence of inflations and interest 
rates. But convergence in rates of inflation might be attained when, for example, one economy is 
grow ing relatively rapidly and another is in recession, hardly a desirable policy outcome. Moreover, as 
will be demonstrated below1, even if the underly ing structures of national economies have converged 
towards a potentially sustainable pattern, the segmentation of responsibility for operating economic 
policy instruments may still create differences in economic performance.
Yet convergence in the rates of price inflation is the fundamental characteristic of convergence 
as far as the EC is concerned 9 (differences in nominal wage inflation should be associated only with 
differences in productivity growth, including the productivity gains of catching up). In these terms, 
there has been significant convergence betw een the members of the ERM. Although the fall in the rate 
of inflation in the 1980s has been shared by both members of the ERM and non-members (indeed the 
proportionate fall in the rate of inflation has been greater for non-members), there has clearly been a 
significant narrowing in the inflation differentials between members of the ERM, particularly among 
the founders of the narrow-band ERM (see table 5).
Table 5 GDP DEFLATORS. 1986-1994. MEMBERS OF THE NARROW BAND ERM AND THE
EC AS A WHOLE.
Narrow-band 
countries: Averages "
Narrow-band 
countries: dispersion b
Community: 
Averagea
Community: 
Dispersion b
1986 GO oc 1.6 5.5 4.3
1987 2.3 1.2 4.2 3.1
1988 2.3 0.9 4.5 3.0
1989 3.0 1.2 5.1 2.7
1990 3.5 0.4 5.7 3.9
1991 4.0 0.8 5.4 2.5
1992 3.8 1.4 4.3 3.1
1993 2.9 2.3 3.5 3.9
1994 2.6 1.1 2.9 2.8
Source: European Economy. No.46. 1990. p 153; No 58. 1994. p. 134.
Weighted average.
b Unweighted arithmetic mean of each country's absolute deviation from the weighted average.
The Commission's evaluation of the impact of EMU is presented in EC (1990b) The definitions of 
convergence are found in pages 37-39.
9
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However, this convergence in inflation rates was accompanied by very low rates of economic 
growth in Belgium. France and the Netherlands, and a somewhat low rate of growth in ERM countries 
generally up to 1987, Indeed, the EC has been distinguished during the 1980s by its low rate of growth 
relative to Japan and the United States and its persistent high rate of unemployment. And the burst of 
growth seen since 1987 has slowed sharply since mid-1990. It is not yet clear whether the attained 
convergence in rates of price inflation is sustainable at reasonable levels of economic growth.
If convergence is to be associated with economic balance in the Community, then price 
convergence is not a sufficient monetary policy tool. Price convergence must also be accompanied by 
balance between the rate of growth of demand and the rate of growth of supply within each major 
region and each nation State. If that balance is not maintained, then the difference must be met by 
resource transfers. Moreover, if an imbalance persists over the medium term, there will be an 
accumulation of debt. In the long term, the continual accumulation of debt is unsustainable, and will 
necessitate painful remedial measures. If this outcome is to be avoided, the real economy measure of 
effective convergence prior to monetary union should be the ability of each country to sustain an 
appropriate balance on current account (appropriate in the light of the pattern of long term capital 
flows) at rates of growth that maintain high levels of employment.
This definition of convergence does not imply uniform productivity throughout the EMU. 
Indeed, even price inflation might not be uniform. What is necessary’ is that the variety of factors 
determining the growth of demand and supply (such as prices, productivity, real wages, investment and 
fiscal balance) should, taken together, ensure a long term balance of aggregate demand and supply.
V. Convergence and National External Balances
Moreover, the EMU must aim for overall external balance. An excessive accumulation of net 
external debt caused by excess demand will necessitate an eventual slow-down in growth of domestic 
demand, possibly well below previous levels, if reduced indebtedness is to be achieved.10 Reduction in 
demand maybe attained either by a reduction in the level or growth rate of per capita income, by a 
steady increase in the level of unemployment, by out-migration, or by a combination of all three. In a 
monetary union the pressure exerted by debt accumulation will be manifest in the markets for public or
There are clearly some circumstances in which resource transfers will not be associated with 
accumulation of indebtedness (public and/or private) in recipient regions or States. Rentier regions and 
States, or regions and States that receive fiscal transfers, aid or long term investment flows, can sustain 
a long-run excess of demand over supply (expenditure over income). Even when resource transfers are 
associated w ith the accumulation of debt, they may prove in the long-run to be self-correcting, if the
10
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private bonds (wherever indebtedness is accumulated) rather than in the foreign exchange markets. 
Although the immediate impact of growing indebtedness is confined to the debtor, rather than making 
all members suffer the impact of an external financial crisis, the consequences in terms of the required 
reduction in the aggregate real income to correct the imbalance are the same anyway.
The Commission of the EC appears to associate excessive regional or national external 
imbalances with public sectors imbalances (EC, 1990b. p. 209). The need for convergence towards a 
sustainable external equilibrium is less apparent since the external current account disequilibria that 
exist at present might be financed without difficulty once capital markets are completely integrated. 
Further convergence in external current accounts is desirable from a policy point of view only if the 
current disequilibria reflect excessive public dissavings. It is therefore not evident that further policy 
action would be necessary to correct current account imbalances once sound public finances have been 
achieved in all member countries.
But this is rather w rong. In fact, the accumulation of debt, either by the public sector or the 
private sector, must ultimate precipitate an external adjustment whether or not there is monetary union. 
In the absence of monetary union it occurs through the foreign exchange markets; in a monetary union 
it occurs through the bond markets. But in both cases, adjustment will take the form of a fall in the 
growth of domestic demand, with the associated downward adjustment in real income. The need for 
external balance is the same, inside or outside a monetary' union, and whether the public sector accounts 
are in balance or not.
There has been no convergence as yet in the trade balances within the EC. Instead, trade 
balances have diverged, particularly those for intra-EC trade. National trade accounts within the EC 
have in the past few years been dominated not only by intra-EC trade, but specifically by trade with 
Germany , with all countries except Ireland experiencing growing bilateral deficits. Since variations in 
real exchange rates have been small, especially in recent years, these trends in trade imbalances suggest 
that a major determinant of a member State's trade performance is its rate of growth relative to 
Germany's.
Whether the trade balance with Germany is a constraint to growth throughout the EC depends 
on the ability of the deficit countries to finance these deficits and any accumulated indebtedness. In 
particular, if Germany were a significant exporter of long term capital (as was the United States in the 
1940s and 1950s). then funding would not be based on short-term, potentially volatile funds and 
expansion could be sustained. However, this has not be the case. From 1990 to 1994, a period in 
which Germany s current account with its EC partners was in surplus, rising from DM 23.12 billion in
absorption of resources results in a rate of growth in competitive productive capacity greater than the 
rate of interest pay able of the debt.
11
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1990 to DM 31.69 billion in 1994. long tenn capital outflow from Germany to the rest of the EC was 
non-existent except for the year 1995. (see table 6).
Table 6 GERMANY: CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE AND LONG TERM CAPITAL
MOVEMENTS WITH REST OF EC. 1990-1996 (DM million).
Current Account Long-term Capital
1990 23.125 + 954
1991 24.233 + 1020
1992 25.298 + 924
1993 27.286 + 800
1994 31.698 + 312
1995 29.773 - 862
1996 27.525 +2.820
Deutsche Bundesbank: Monthly Report. February 1997. vol . 49. No 2.
- Net capital outflow 
+Net capital inflow
The large scale of German surpluses, given the very large growth differential betw een Germany 
and other EC countries, indicates that that the real economy definition of convergence has not been met 
w ithin the EC Such lack of convergence imposes a further asymmetry on national economic policies, 
an asymmetry which was familiar on a wider scale during the Bretton Woods period. Essentially, 
deficit countries were forced to limit the growth of their deficits, where surplus countries needed to do 
nothing. The action for deficit countries would consist of a devaluation of their currency, a slow-down 
in growth relative to surplus countries or, more likely, a combination of both. In every case, a deficit 
country suffered a reduction in real income growth. Long term difficulties can arise if the asymmetry is 
self-perpetuating, as those countries forced to grow slowly tend to invest less and to suffer a cumulative 
decline in competitiveness. This real asymmetry will not be removed by EMU. Indeed, the lack of 
current account calculations may tend to obscure the extent of the imbalances, limiting the pressure for 
remedial action, and hence reinforcing the eventual deflationary impact.
The impact of a correction in unbalanced trade will not be confined to the deficit countries 
within the EC. It will impose a deflationary bias on the entire trading system as well, as deficit 
countries deflate, and as there is no incentive for surplus countries to expand. In deficit countries, 
police is constrained by international priorities. In surplus countries, policy may be made with respect 
only to domestic concerns, with no overriding concern for international balances. But deflation is 
contagious, since the slow-down in deficit countries cuts back the exports of surplus countries. The 
more closely integrated the trading system, the more powerful the contagion will be The EC, for 
instance, has clearly displayed those characteristics the past decade. And as the importance of intra-EC 
trade in relation to total trade grows, the deflationary bias will become even more severe.
12
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An important, though probably temporary, qualification should be entered at this point. The 
absorption of the eastern regions within the Federal Republic of Germany is resulting in an acceleration 
in German growth, combined with a deterioration in the average competitiveness of the country as a 
whole. The acceleration of German growth rate will allow other countries to grow faster without 
running large trade imbalances with Germany. The special problems created by the need to absorb the 
low-productivity eastern part of the country w ill put great pressure on the German investment goods 
industries, with demand spilling over to other parts of the EC. This will tend to reduce, albeit perhaps 
only temporarily, the imbalance in EC trade patterns.
VI. Policy Responses to Imbalances Within the Community
The problems of asymmetry in trade arise from differences in relative competitiveness between 
countries and regions In the absence of sustained long-term transfers (such as long-term capital 
movements) from the more competitive to the less competitive, reasonable balance may alternatively be 
sustained by: changes in relative price levels, changes in levels and relative rates of growth of real 
income, changes in the foundations in competitiveness (such as quality of capacity, quality of labor 
force, rates of innovation, design and marketing); and labor migration. Especially, under both the new 
EMS and full monetary union, the real exchange rates between deficit countries and Germany can only 
be lowered by deficit countries' sustaining a lower rate of inflation than Germany.
Attainment of EMU might be expected to increase the possibilities for international and 
regional adjustment through a mixture of more flexible wages and larger long-term capital flows. 
However, the experience of large federal economies (such as the United States) suggests that neither 
mechanism will prove sufficient to significantly reduce inequalities in regional incomes and 
competitiveness.
The completion of the EMS and the attainment of monetary union w ill need to be in place for a 
number of years before the EC attains the unified financial characteristics of the United States. Yet 
differences in per capita GDP among the Canadian provinces are greater than those between the 
member States of the EC (EC. 1977. ch.7; 1990b. p. 230). However, at lower levels of aggregation, 
income differentials are greater within the EC. The segmentation of the European labor market 
provides greater scope for enlarged wage differentials than may exist in linguistically homogeneous 
States. Significant wage differentials in the United States have not led to long-term convergence in 
regional economic performance; but even so. they have induced labor migration on a scale that is 
politically unacceptable and that would be economically inefficient within the EC.
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Such long-term regional problems require a long term solution Overcoming an uncompetitive 
position and securing the scale and composition of investment to establish competitiveness is a difficult, 
often painful, process. Diversion of resources towards investment will typically place a severe limit on 
consumption growth in an economy in which growth is already constrained by lack of competitiveness. 
Imports of capital and technology may speed improvements in competitiveness and increased 
competitive pressure, as in the completion of the internal market, will in itself encourage restructuring. 
However, the comparative advantage of the more competitive countries and regions will exert powerful 
centripetal forces on the EC economy and further impoverish the more uncompetitive regions. Regional 
imbalances will result in a tendency for the EC as a whole to underperform as it has done for much of 
the past decade
In the circumstances of the 1990s. both political cohesion and economic efficiency in the EC 
w ill require a method of recycling persistent surpluses and alleviating persistent regional and national 
deficits Significant divergence's in competitiveness must be offset by long-term transfers or they will 
result in persistent differences in rates of growth which tend ultimately to exacerbate the imbalance. 
Even relatively loose international arrangements such as the Bretton Woods system could not survive 
without long-term capital transfers from the more competitive to the less competitive.
There are three alternative methods of redistribution within mature monetary unions, such as 
Germany or the United States. First, it can be achieved through personal income tax. public expenditure 
programs and social security benefits. So long as a country has a progressive fiscal and benefits 
system, and public expenditure provides roughly equal per capita benefits, then income is transferred 
automatically from relatively prosperous to relatively poor regions, limiting the growth of indebtedness 
and the relative decline in the standard of living in the poorer regions. This will not be the case with the 
EC
Second, redistribution can be attained through intergovernmental grants or tax-sharing 
arrangements, which redistribute income according to specific criteria, such as per capita income or 
fiscal capacity. Australia. Canada and the United States (that is until revenue-sharing was abolished by 
President Reagan) have major federal grant systems In Germany transfers are made directly among the 
various States. In the United Kingdom there are substantial grants from the central Government to the 
local authorities. But such large-scale fiscal transfers between the member States of the Community 
are explicitly ruled out in the Delors Report.
Finally, specific purpose grants could be considered. The United States makes the greatest use 
of such specific transfers, notably by means of good stamps and urban renewal programs The regional 
and social funds of the EC also fall into this category of transfer program, as. in a distinctly perverse 
fashion (redistributing income from poor to rich), does the CAP
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Reliance on specific-purpose grants alone is unlikely to provide an adequate scale of recycled 
savings within the monetary union. Yet, under the Community's current political circumstances, there 
will neither be an integrated tax and benefit system, however limited in scope, nor a system of direct 
fiscal transfers.
Furthermore, the peculiar macroeconomic design of EMU is likely to prove inefficient, even if 
real economic convergence is broadly attained. The fact that EMU throws all the weight of national 
economic management onto autonomous national fiscal policies will severely limit the capacity and 
effectiveness of this fiscal management, and will tent to reinforce the impact of differential shocks that 
might otherwise be satisfactory managed. An increase in spending intended to offset a downward shock 
to a national economy must, given the EMU structures against monetization of debt, be financed by 
borrowing. This borrowing will tend to create a fiscal obligation in the future. Higher taxes will then 
tend to induce entrepreneurs to seek investment opportunities in areas in the Community where taxes 
are low er. The cases of various regions within a country are familiar w here attempts by the authorities 
to offset a drop in activity through greater spending results eventually in greater taxation, out-migration 
of industry, further increases in tax rates on a falling tax base, further out-migration and so on. This 
same phenomenon will now be reproduced on a national scale. As a consequence, either the use of 
fiscal policy is discouraged or its positive effects severely limited in the EC. Both negative growth 
effects are greater if there are large external spillovers from changes in national fiscal stances.
These limitations on the effectiveness of national fiscal policy could be overcome if at least part 
of this were organized at the Community level. The externalities associated w ith national fiscal policy 
would be internalized. But. more important, spending within one nation or region would not result in 
localized increases in taxation. Instead, it would be funded within the Community as a whole with the 
more prosperous regions contributing proportionately greater sums. In effect, a Community-wide fiscal 
policy would be a regional stabilizer, offsetting, at least in part, localized shocks.
This analysis suggests that in the absence of a significant redesigning of Community 
institutions, the low rate of growth and high levels of unemployment that have characterized the past 
decade will become endemic. They will probably be accompanied by relatively low rates of inflation 
as well. Certainly, inflation rates are likely to be relatively low in those member States, such as Greece, 
that have experienced inflation rates substantially in excess of German rates. Although interest rates 
may be somewhat lower than they are within the new EMS, the inefficient fiscal design of the 
Community suggests that low growth and low inflation will still be accompanied by high real interest 
rates, as monetary policy is used as the principal means by which an independent Eurofed manages 
effective demand within a deregulated financial sy stem. Without a significant change in the formulation 
and execution of fiscal policy, therefore, the post-EMU Community is unlikely to have an expansionary 
impact on the world economy; rather the reverse is likely.
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VII. Greece and the EMU
The participation of Greece in the transition process towards monetary union, if it is to prove 
macroeconomically efficient and socially acceptable, must be associated with a serious attention by 
policy makers to the considerable problems arising, given the structures of EMU, from the process of 
transition. The focus must rest on a decisive co-operation between economic and political agents in 
bringing macroeconomic imbalances and structural inefficiencies more in line with their EC average 
counterparts and in mobilizing and implementing efficient structural policies with a long-term view 
w ithin the institutional arrangements historically and socially established in the nation
The existing differences in performance between Greece and other member states of the EC are 
significant and the distance to be. therefore, covered is quite substantial (see table 7).
Table 7 PERFORMANCE OF EC MEMBER STATES IN RELATION TO CONVERGENCE IN
1994-1996
Consumer
price
index
Govern 
Deficit / 
GDP 
ratio
Govern. 
Debt / 
GDP 
ratio
Long term 
interest 
rate
GDP 
• growth 
(percent 
change)
Real unit 
labor cost 
(percent 
change)
Productivity
growth
(percent
change)
FR 1.6 4.5 57.8 6.8 2.0 -0.8 1.5
FRG 1.9 3.2 62.4 6.1 1.8 -1.1 2.2
UK 2.4 5.2 56.2 7.4 2.9 -1.2 2.2
GR 8.8 9.1 11 1.4 16.4 2.0 1.5 0.7
EC 2.7 4.6 74.3 7.1 2.3 -1.3 2.0
Source: European Economy, Supplement A. June 1996.
During the period 1994-6. inflation in Greece, as measured by the consumer price index, was 
8 8 percent, more than three times higher compared with the EC average of 2.7 percent. In the same 
\ear. net borrowing requirements and the accumulated public debt were 9.1 percent and 111.4 percent 
of GDP respectively: The corresponding EC averages were 4.6 percent and 74.3 percent. Long term 
interest rates were 16.4 percent, more than twice the EC average of 7.1 percent. Economic growth was 
2.0 percent which is 15 percent lower than the EC average. During 1994-6. real unit labor cost in 
Greece has increased by 1.5 percent, whilst the EC average has fallen by 1.3 percent. Finally, 
productivity growth was at an anemic 0.7 percent, almost a third compared with the EC average.
A better understanding of the relative state of the Greek economy and the country s level of 
development emerges from a carefiile consideration of the country's overall international trade 
performance (see table 8):
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Table 8 TRADE AND CURRENT BALANCES AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE
COUNTRY Trade Balance 
($ billion)
Current Balance 
($ billion)
Current Balance 
(percentage of 
GDP/GNP)
Export Market 
Share
(percentage)
Export
Market Share 
(growth rate. 
1985-92)
Greece 0.1
1980 0.4
1992 -11.6 -2.1 -2.8 0.3
1993 -10.6 -0.7 -1.0
1994 -11.5 -1.0 -1.3
Germany 1.3
1980 16.8
1992 32.0 -22.0 -1.1 17.3
1993 42.1 -21.3 -1.1
1994 59.2 -13.0 -0.7
France 1.7
1980 9.4
1992 2.9 4.3 0.3 8.9
1993 9.3 10.9 0.9
1994 16.1 18.4 1.4
UK 0.2
1980 8.8
1992 -23.5 -15.1 -1.4 7.2
1993 -20.5 -16.4 -1.7
1994 -25.2 -21.3 -2.1
Italv 0.4
1980 7.0
1992 2.5 -26.6 -2.2 6.7
1993 34.1 12.4 1.3
1994 43.8 20.0 2.0
Source: OECD Annual Review 1994 - Industrial Policy, pp. 129, 136. 138. 
“ manufacturing exports of a giv en country in total OECD exports
During the 1992-4 period. Greece experienced constant trade deficits which remained 
approximately at the same level, whilst the other European countries, with the exception of the UK, 
experienced trade surpluses which, moreover, improved. In the same period, the country s current 
balance, though significantly improved as a result of substantial inflows of capital, was negative too. 
Thus, the international competitiveness of Greek manufacturing was maintained at low levels and its 
ability to capture foreign market share has been diminished. The shifts in the market share of the 
country s manufacturing exports show that whatever growth in foreign market penetration was 
achieved during the 1970s was followed bv a stagnation during the 1980s. Of course, these downward 
trends in foreign market penetration were experienced by the other European countries too However, 
these countries succeeded in eventually overcoming their constraints and gradually improving their 
export performance by substantially more than Greece managed to do (compare the very low 0.1
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percent of Greece's foreign market share average growth rate for the period 1985-92 with that of the 
other European countries).
The shifts in export market shares discussed above are due to a number of factors shaping 
international competitiveness. Broadly speaking, these can be classified into price and non­
price/structural factors. The identification of the relative significance of some of those factors can be 
conducted by constant market share analysis" (see tables 9a, 9b). Table 9a shows the calculations for 
the composition and destination of domestic exports by selected OECD countries in absolute terms, i.e. 
the difference in decomposition between 1980 and 1992 of a country's exports as a percentage of total 
OECD exports. This permits the analysis to capture shifts in the structure of the overall trend and thus 
visualise the losses and gains of foreign market shares by each country. Thus, during 1980-92, Greece 
has experienced a fall, in absolute terms, in its share of OECD exports. Even though most large 
European countries seem to have lost foreign market share as well, Greece stands in sharp contrast to 
all smaller EC countries, except Belgium, who saw their foreign market share of OECD exports to rise 
instead. Greek export industry has proven unable to penetrate foreign markets and capture any 
significant portion of the lost markets by the larger European economies. Moreover, it has proven 
unable to adjust the composition of its exports adequately so that to catch up with the faster growth and 
diversification of w orld trade. As a result. Greek export products exhibited very low ability relative to 
the other small European countries to adapt to the world changes characterizing the market composition 
of commodities.
On the other hand, table 9b shows, for the same period, the calculations for the composition 
and destination of exports in relative terms, i.e. as a percentage change and decomposition of a 
country 's exports as a percentage of total OECD exports. This allows for a comparison of the 
evolution of export performance of smaller countries: regardless of the size of their initial shares, all 
countries that doubled their export market shares, are taken to have expanded at the same speed and 
thus performed equally well. The same conclusions about overall Greek export performance can be 
drawn here as well. Greece has been unable to follow the strengthened ability of the largest European 
economies, with the exception of France, to adapt to the changing commodity and geographical 
structure of trade, much less was it able to achieve the spectacular performance by the smaller 
countries, such as Portugal. Spain and Ireland. The relative importance of Greece's traditional exports 
and that of its trading partners has declined in contrast to what is evident in most European countries.
Constant market share analysis is a methodology aiming at the identification of the underlying 
determining factors of international competitiveness by looking behind the evolution of market shares. 
This is achieved by decomposing the changes that have occurred in export markets into five different 
effects each reflecting changes in the composition of products and the destination of exports as well as 
the capacity of the trading countries to adapt to them (Fagerberg and Sollie. 1987).
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Table 9a. CONSTANT MARKET SFLARE ANALYSIS OF EXPORTS (percentages)*
Market
share
(percent)
Difference
1980-92
Market
share
effect* 1
Commodity
composition
effect'
Commodity
adaptation
effecC
Market
composition
effect4
Market
adaptation
effect'
Greece -0.08 0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.02
1980 0.38
1992 0.30
Germanv 0.48 0.70 0.67 -0.33 -0.57 0.07
1980 16.02
1992 16.50
France -0.23 0.32 0.09 -0.23 -0.45 0.09
1980 9.23
1992 9.00
UK -1.62 -1.46 0.13 0.23 -0.54 0.08
1980 8.62
1992 7.00
Italv 0.19 0.80 0.28 -0.41 -0.27 -0.21
1980 6.41
1992 6.60
Spain 0.77 0.92 -0.08 ' -0.02 -0.10 0.05
1980 1.73
1992 2.50 *·
Ireland 0.39 0.33 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01
1980 0.73
1992 1.10
Belgium -0.39 -0.16 -0.19 -0.01 0.10 -0.12
1980 5.09
1992 4.70
Portugal 0.32 0.35 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
1980 0.38
1992 0.70
Source: OECD Annual Review - Industrial Policy, pp. 138, 140.
* calculations exclude oil and gas.
1 total change in the exporting country's share in the imports of each partner country, weighted by the 
initial commodity composition of each partner country’s imports and by each partner country's share in 
total OECD imports.
" total change in the shares of the partner countries in total OECD imports (market distribution of 
exports)
change in commodity shares in OECD imports (commodity composition of exports)
" degree of success of the exporting country in adapting the market composition of its exports to the 
total change in the market composition of OECD imports (geographical distribution of exports)
' degree of success of the exporting country in adapting the commodity composition ofits exports to the 
overall change in the commodity composition of total OECD imports
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Table 9b. CONSTANT MARKET SHARE ANALYSIS OF EXPORTS (percentage change)*
Market share 
(percentage 
change)
Relative
Difference
1980-92
Market
share
effect
Commodity
composition
effect
Commodity
adaptation
effect
Market
composition
effect
Market
adaptation
effect
Greece -2.6 18.4 -13.2 -2.6 -10.5 5.3
1980 0.40
1992 0.30
Germany 3.2 4.4 4.2 -2.1 -3.7 0.4
1980 16.00
1992 16.50
France -2.0 3.5 1.0 -2.5 -4.9 1.0
1980 9.20
1992 9.00
UK -18.1 -16.9 1.5 2.7 -6.3 0.9
1980 8.60
1992 7.00
Italv 3.1 12.5 4.4 -6.4 -4.2 -3.3
1980 6.40
1992 6.60
Spain 44.5 53.2 -4.6 -1.2 -5.8 2.9
1980 1.70
1992 2.50
Ireland 53.4 45.2 0.0 4.1 2.7 1.4
1980 0.73
1992 1.10
Belgium -7.50 -3.1 -3.7 -0.2 2.0 -2.4
1980 5.09
1992 4.70
Portugal 89.5 92.1 -2.6 -2.6 0.00 0.00
1980 0.38
1992 0.70
Source: OECD Annual Review (Industrial policy), pp. 138, 140. 
* calculations exclude oil and gas.
Indeed, these results shouldn't be surprising. The country's structural transformation required 
by international competition has not been adequate. Net export performance of Greek agriculture and 
services shifted from a surplus position during the 1970s and mid-1980s to a deficit position since then 
(Gianmtsis, 1993). During the same time, industrial export performance, particularly of the 
technologically advanced capital good sectors, has been showing a steady deterioration Following the 
opening up of trade, the loss of competitiveness in Greek industry has been associated with an increase 
in domestic market penetration by foreign imports resulting in a reduction of the share of industry by 5 
per cent on average. Even though export performance in manufacturing increased in volume, import 
penetration increased comparatively more. As a result, the balance of trade has been constantly 
negative, starting from 16.6 per cent of GNP in 1980. then increasing to 18.9 per cent in 1985. then 
falling to 13.8 per cent in 1994 and finally rising again with sign of further deterioration (Bank of
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Greece: Report of the President. 1996. p. 15). The continuous erosion of Greek industrial 
competitiveness both domestically and abroad was associated with a shrinking of its 'natural’ industrial 
base which further compounded the loss of competitive edge. The reduction in market share and the 
associated decline in exports created a vicious circle of reduced sales, which caused a productivity 
slow-down and this, in turn, further reduced exports.
It is, therefore, evident that any aspirations for faster economic growth in Greece cannot be 
readily warranted on the basis of foreign trade performance. The existence of growing trade deficits is 
a serious problem in the economy for they may turn out to be unsustainable if they lead inexorably to a 
rising ratio of debt to GNP. At some stage, the rising burden of servicing the debt will require the 
economy to generate large trade surpluses so that a net transfer of resources will pay for the interest on 
accumulated borrowing. Alternatively, the Greek economy may be trapped in a syndrome of slow 
growth and unemployment which will rise from one business cycle to the next. As foreign borrowing 
increases to balance the resulting current account deficit, the cost of borrowing will rise too but there is 
no automatic mechanism of self-adjustment. The attachment of risk premia on capital flows may not 
work in a gradual and smooth manner Indeed, as the ratio of foreign debt to GNP rises, financial 
markets will become increasingly nervous about a collapse in the exchange rate of the drachma and the 
consequent capital losses. If the exchange rate is allowed to fall (which, of course, will depend on 
several factors, domestic and foreign), speculative actions are likely to be further destabilizing, leading 
to a rapid fall in the value of the domestic currency. The required use of higher interest rates to defend 
the currency and thus balance the current account through capital inflows will push the Greek economy, 
through adverse effects on investment, into recession with the consequent slowdown in efficiency 
growth and further loss of competitiveness. A higher rate of net inflow of interest, profits and 
dividends as well as other forms of funds (such as those by the EC), compared to the economy's low 
growth rate may not reverse this tendency if the Greek economy falls into a "wealth trap", that is uses 
all that revenues to absorb more manufacturing imports or consume rather than invest in 
manufacturing.
The loss of competitiveness may, in turn, be seen as the cause and result of insufficient 
investment opportunities and inefficient use of funds. The degradation of the national industrial base is 
reflected on the structure of investment expenditures in the last half of the 1980s (see table 10).1_
Unfortunately, our effort to get more updated cross-country data on the structure of investment 
proved futile.
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Tabic 10. STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN EC. 1986-1989. (percentages)
Replacement Extension Rationalization
;86 '87 ;88 -89 •86 •87 •88 -89
Ό
 
O
C 
I
•87 _ •88 •89
Greece 15 36 37 42 39 30 30 36 46 34 33 22
Germany 25 25 25 24 26 26 25 27 50 49 51 49
France 29 29 29 26 21 28 32 35 40 43 39 39
Italy - 29 26 22 - 21 30 33 - 50 44 45
Spain - 18 14 15 - 32 34 30 - 51 52 55
Ireland - 28 22 19 - 25 26 35 - 48 52 46
EC - 27 27 24 . 28 30 32 - 45 43 44
Source: European Economy. Supplement B. March 1989.
Investment expenditures in Greece compared both with other member states and the EC as a 
whole were directed more towards the replacement of obsolete capital equipment rather than 
technological advance in products and processes (see also Lyberaki. 1993). Indeed, from 1986 to 1989 
only the share of investment for replacement increased by almost three times whilst investment for 
rationalization, denoting product and process development, organizational innovations, changes in 
production set-ups was reduced in half. The average share of both components for the EC as a whole 
remained roughly the same during that period. The diffusion of new technologies with the associated 
spillovers due to forward and backward linkages that tended to characterize the incoming of a new 
technological paradigm in most of Europe during the 1980s does not seem to be a notable feature of 
Greece's economic adjustment. The introduction of incremental improvements in technology and the 
reorganization of existing production possibilities was not embedded in a more general, technology- 
related. strategy of industrial restructuring. The rate of innovation has not matched the EC average and 
the cumulative effects it is associated with were absent, or very anemic, from Greek manufacturing. 
This should not. however, surprise us In mid-8()s. the share of GDP in Greece devoted to research and 
development was only 0.33 per cent compared with 2.70 per cent in Germany and 1.5 per cent in EC as 
a whole in the same period (Vaitsos and Giannitsis. 1987).
The need for long term capital investment for the restoration of respectable income growth 
rates along w ith the necessary improvements in the quality' of capacity and labor force and the rates of 
innovation that consolidate the efficacy of 'non-price' factors in international competitiveness seem to 
have been notably absent from Greek industrial considerations. Excessive reliance on monetary' 
instruments to achieve nominal convergence for frill EMU participation will not achieve the intended 
results. We are somewhat skeptical of the suggestion that, at the face of structural deficiencies in the 
Greek economy, exchange rate realignments and wage and price deflation will suffice to correct the
22
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:38:11 EET - 137.108.70.7
imbalances and gear the economy towards macroeconomically efficient growth.13 A consistent short­
term policy-mix pursued by socially respectable monetary and fiscal authorities does raise the chances 
for improvement but for a shift to a sustainable long term growth path only a long term sound industrial 
and trade policy, aiming at productivity increases, network development and social cooperation, can 
provide a firm basis.
A general slowdown in the expansion process of Greece could be avoided by enabling the 
w eak, stmcturalh -deficit sectors of the economy to grow at rates higher than their respective balance of 
payments equilibrium rates. This means effectively allowing those sectors to run continuous current 
account deficits. Current policies, on the contrary, usually aim at leaving the burden of adjustment to 
be borne by the weak sectors themselves by forcing them to live within their Own means'. In such a 
case, a generalized contraction of domestic effective demand may not be avoided. But the slow down of 
the growth of effective demand in those weak sectors will spread from sector to sector through the 
foreign trade multiplier. The situation w ill get worse if world growth rates are relatively low. In this 
wav a generalized deflationary process might set in with adverse effects on output and employment. As 
a long-run consequence. Greece's competitiveness will be steadily deteriorating, as is regulated by the 
free operation of the markets in a world economy, and performance differentials will be progressively 
increased. This will reinforce the tendency for retarded growth, stmctural decline and technological 
slow down. The overall effect will, of course, depend upon the structure of Greece’s net exports 
position which, at any one time, reflects the process of development in terms of dynamic economies of 
scale, learning and technical change. At the same time, it determines the potential for market expansion 
and the opportunity for efficiency enhancement It is in this respect that Greek policy makers should 
not rest their efforts on merely meeting the standards for participation in the next stage of EMU, for
This seems to be the main conclusion reached by Papademos (1993) and Alogoskoufis (1993). 
While they convincingly argue that a proper exchange-rate policy associated with financial markets 
deregulation will indeed enhance the monetary authorities' effectiveness in reducing inflation, they tend 
to over-emphasize the need for a consistent policy-mix, without a proper, to my view , account of the 
constraints, domestic and international, involved. In their view, since nominal convergence must be the 
main police target, a consistent monetary policy associated with an accommodating fiscal policy will 
create the conditions for successful entry in the ERM. The latter’s disciplinary power will then act as 
the catalyst for domestic rationalization. Papademos argues for a more gradual process of ERM 
participation for this would provide the necessary time for economic and social adjuastment (both 
short-term and long term) to the entry shock, whilst Alogoskoufis strikes through the heart by 
advocating a rather immediate entry for this, given his faith on the effectiveness of ERM’s disciplinary 
power, will bring Greece faster to the horseback of nominal convergence. However, the extent to which 
exchange rate and interest rate flexibility w ill, in conditions of high inflation, can be relied on to reduce 
trade and fiscal deficits towards their equilibtium levels without being associated w ith great losses in 
output and employment is questionable both on theoretical and empirical grounds. This postulate is 
subject to the specific assumptions made about the functioning of the economy. For an alternative 
analvtical presentation of the macroeoconomic impact of devaluation and deflation that emphasizes the 
constraining role of the structuralist characterisitics in an economy, see Taylor (1991).
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such a police' may turn out to be associated with politically unacceptable levels of social cost in terms 
of high unemploy ment and social unrest. The very process of EMU. given the foundations on which it 
is designed, does not guarantee sustainable long term outcomes, if high employment, high growth, 
increased international competitiveness are sought for.
VIII. Conclusion
The design of EMU is not a purely economic exercise. Rather, the division of responsibilities 
has been in large part dictated by political considerations within the EC. The peculiar character of the 
European debate at the moment means that although there is a large measure of agreement - though not 
unanimity - on the establishment of an independent Eurofed, there is no likelihood of agreement on 
developing a common EC fiscal policy, or to harid exchange rate policy over to the Eurofed. The 
contradiction arises not only from politics as such, but also from the lack of a coherent theory of 
economic policy for the monetary union, and hence the lack of an appropriately designed institutional
»·,
frameyyork to execute policy. The theoretical error appears to steam from a simplistic monetarism, 
which suggests that the monetary policy affects only nominal variables, and that the real economy is 
ahvays at or near equilibrium. If this framework is abandoned for either theoretical or empirical 
reasons, then fiscal and monetary policies can no longer be assumed to be independent, and both have 
real consequences. Moreover, if fiscal policies and monetary policies are independent, then dividing 
responsibility for them is likely to be inefficient and counter-productive. Similar arguments apply to 
the relationship between monetary and exchange rate policy and other aspects of external economic 
relations. It is this inefficiency in the policy framework proposed for monetary' union, not the monetary 
union itself, that poses negative macroeconomic consequences for both member States and non-member 
States For that purpose. Greek economic policies should not take their fate as already given, but aim 
at providing a frameyvork for development that secures the achievement and maintenance of competitive 
edge both domestically and abroad as a basic presupposition for effective growth.
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